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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STERLING B. CANNON, GEORGE H. MAXWELL, 
DAVE DAVIS, ART VAN LUYK, and TERRY 
TEEPLES, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
STEVENS SCHOOLS OF BUSINESS, INC., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
CASE NO. 14378 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This was an action by five of defendant's former em-
ployees for commissions claimed to have accrued after the 
employer ceased doing business. The defendant counterclaimed 
for sums advanced to the plaintiffs in excess of commissions 
earned, and for abuse of process. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The court ruled for all of the plaintiffs; set off ad-
vances made to three of them; dismissed the counterclaim; and 
entered judgment against defendant for $35,329.74. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant and appellant seeks reversal of the judgment 
and remand to the district court with direction to enter 
judgment in favor of appellant on its counterclaim for 
advances made to the plaintiffs. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant is a close corporation owned by members 
of the Stevens family (Tr. 253). For decades they operated 
the Stevens Henager Business Colleges in Salt Lake City and 
Ogden until December 31, 1973, when the Salt Lake City 
college was closed and the Ogden college was sold (Tr. 253) . 
Prior to December 31, 1973, each of the plaintiffs were 
employed by the colleges for varying periods as "outside 
admissions counselors," whose duties including visiting 
various high schools, carrying out public relations, and 
enrolling students (Tr. 14). Plaintiff Davis resigned in 
September, 1973, and plaintiff Maxwell on July 15, 1973 (Tr. 
138, 219). 
Each of the plaintiffs had entered into employment 
agreements with defendant-appellant, Stevens Schools of 
Business, Inc. (hereinafter "Stevens"). Sterling Cannonfs 
agreement (Exhibit 1-P) was effective April 1, 1972; Art Van 
Luyk's agreement (Exhibit 21-D) was effective January 1, 
1973; Dave Davis's agreement (Exhibit 23-B) was effective 
April 8, 1972; Terry W. Teeplesfs agreement (Exhibit 
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29-D) was effective April 1, 1972; and George Maxwell's 
agreement (Exhibit 31-D) was effective April 1, 1972. 
Plaintiffs Cannon and Van Luyk performed their services 
primarily for the Ogden college, while the other plaintiffs 
performed their services primarily for the Salt Lake City 
college. 
All of the agreements were substantially the same. 
They contained, among others, the following provisions: 
[The employee agrees] To accept as compen-
sation under this Employment Agreement a salary 
of $None per — plus commissions on tuitions 
received by the College from all approved en-
rollments credited to you under the terms of this 
Employment Agreement as follows: 13 1/2% for en-
rollments taken where the current address is in 
Weber, Salt Lake, or Davis counties, and 15% for 
all enrollments taken outside these counties. 
An additional 5% incentive commission will be 
credited to your commission account at year end 
in addition to the commissions shown above for 
all tuition income over $100,000 paid by your 
students during any calendar year (January 1st 
to December 31st). 
Your draws against this commission will be 
in accordance with the attached Addendum A which 
is made a part of this agreement by referencec 
* * * 
IX 
In the event this agreement is terminated 
by either party and there exists a deficit bal-
ance in your commissions account, the commissions 
earned from the date of termination forward will 
be applied towards the deficit balance until that 
- 3 -
balance has been satisfied. Credit balances on 
this commission account after termination can be 
drawn quarterly, the draw to be made during the 
last month of each quarter permitting the college 
to complete the accounting statements and reports 
for that quarter. 
* * * 
I have read and do understand the above Em-
ployment Agreement. It is my understanding that 
this agreement will remain in force so long as it 
is mutually agreeable to both parties. * * * 
Addendum A to the agreement provided for "sustaining 
draws" of $150 per week, to be varied under certain circum-
stances. In May, 1973, the draw for each of the employees 
was increased to $1,000 per month, payable $250 per week 
(Tr. 254, Exhibit 35-D). 
In 1971 and 1972 the colleges were financially marginal 
operations. In 1972 the Ogden college was profitable but 
the Salt Lake college was not, and there was a total profit 
of $10,000 for both. In 1973 daytime enrollments were sub-
stantially down from 1972 (Tr. 259), and during that year 
Stevens suffered a net loss of approximately $14 3,000 
(Tr. 262). 
The managers of Stevens found that they could not 
compete in Salt Lake City with the L.D.S. Business College 
because the church-operated college offered considerably 
lower tuitions and refused to raise them, in fact indicated 
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that they were going to reduce tuitions (Tr. 28 9) . Although 
Stevens's costs had increased, enrollments were falling (Tr, 
351). It was determined that it would be impossible to keep 
the Salt Lake college profitable and that it would have to 
be closed (Tr. 299). Unable to meet the L.D.S. competition, 
Stevens attempted to either buy or sell to the L.D.S. 
Business College, but L.D.S. refused to either sell or buy 
(Tr. 354). 
In the first part of November, 1973, Stevens suggested 
to L.D.S. Business College that it might be the subject of 
an anti-trust action (Tr. 359). As a consequence (Tr. 438), 
in December, 1973, a settlement agreement was entered into 
with L.D.S. Business College which recited that Stevens 
Schools would no longer operate the Stevens Henager Business 
College in Salt Lake City, would use its efforts to en-
courage present students to become enrolled in L.D.S. 
Business College, would refer inquiries to L.D.S., give the 
files and records to L.D.S., and make available permanent 
records of all students past and present. Stevens re-
leased L.D.S. Business College, the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints, and all officers and employees from 
all liability, claims or demands of whatsoever kind or 
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nature, and agreed generally not to compete with L.D.S. 
Business College for a specified period, or to sell assets 
to others who would be in competition with L.D.S. Business 
College. As consideration for the various agreements of 
Stevens Schools, L.D.S. Business College agreed to pay the 
sum of $200,000 (Exhibit 13-P). The Stevens Henager Business 
College in Salt Lake City closed as of December 31, 1973, 
and has not operated since. 
Also in December, 1973, Stevens sold the assets of 
the Ogden college to Fahy S. and Ethel B. Robinson for a 
basic purchase price of $267,000 (Exhibit 6-P) . In addition 
to the stated purchase price, the Robinsons agreed to pay 
"receivables from admission counselors as of 12/31/73 on or 
before July 15, 1974." The receivables as shown on the 
schedule to the contract were $5,544.06 owed by plaintiff 
Cannon and $3,069.07 owed by plaintiff Van Luyk. 
Stevens conducted no operations after December 31, 
1973. As of that date, based on commissions and sustaining 
draws, plaintiff Maxwell had a credit balance of $381.53; 
plaintiff Cannon a debit balance of $4,674.41; plaintiff 
Davis a debit balance of $3,683.28; plaintiff Van Luyk a debit 
balance of $3,069.07; and plaintiff Teeples a debit balance 
of $5,826.23 (Exhibit 39-D, Tr. 306-308). 
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The Robinsons paid the receivables as provided in the 
contract (Exhibits 14-P and 15-P). On or about January 31, 
1974, Stevens sent settlement checks to plaintiffs Van Luyk, 
Teeples, and Maxwell. The check sent to plaintiff Van Luyk 
(Exhibit 20-D) contained the following endorsement: 
Endorsement of this check constitutes acknow-
ledgement of the termination effective 12-31-73, 
of my Employment Agreement with Stevens Henager 
College dated May 29, 1973, and constitutes 
final and full payment by Stevens Henager Col-
lege to me in settlement of any and all obli-
gations due me from Stevens Henager College. 
Signed 
The form of the endorsement on the Teeples and Maxwell checks 
was the same, except for the date of the employment agreement 
(Exhibits 28-D and 32-D). 
Plaintiff Teeples signed the endorsement in the form 
presented to him, but plaintiffs Van Luyk and Maxwell added 
the underscored language to the endorsements so that they 
read as follows: 
Endorser ["endorsee" on Maxwell's] in no way 
agrees that endorsement of this check consti-
tutes acknowledgement * * * and constitutes 
final and full payment by Stevens Henager 
College to me in settlement of any and all 
obligations due me from Stevens Henager College. 
The checks were cashed by the three plaintiffs without 
having discussed them with Stevens or objecting to the form 
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of the endorsements (Tr. 198, 225, 351). Plaintiff Van 
Luyk knew he had claims against Stevens, and consulted an 
attorney before endorsing the check (Tr. 131). Teeples 
didn't agree with the endorsement and knew it was meant to 
settle future commissions, but he signed it and cashed it 
(Tr. 189). Plaintiff Maxwell felt he had additional claims 
and instructed his secretary to modify the endorsement (Tr. 
225) . 
On or about February 13, 1974, plaintiff Cannon, through 
his attorney, made a demand upon Stevens and upon the Robinsons 
for commissions earned on tuitions paid to the Ogden school 
after January 1, 1974 (Exhibit 19-D). 
The demand was not met, and on March 12, 1974, plain-
tiffs Cannon, Maxwell, and Davis filed what was denominated 
a class action against Stevens and three John Does (R. 515) . 
During the course of the proceedings, the court ordered 
that the matter should not be maintained as a class action 
(R. 539) t and Van Luyk and Teeples were added as plaintiffs 
(R. 729-732). 
The cause was tried before Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Sr., 
without a jury, following which the court found that plaintiffs 
Cannon and Van Luyk were entitled to commissions based upon 
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tuitions paid to the Ogden school after January 1, 1974, and 
that plaintiffs Davis, Teeples, and Maxwell were entitled to 
commissions on tuitions that, according to the plaintiffs' 
estimates, would have been due from operation of the Salt 
Lake college if it had continued (R. 764-765). The court 
found that plaintiff Davis was entitled to $9,397,46, less 
deficit balance of $3,683.28, or $5,714.18; that plaintiff 
Teeples was entitled to $10,293.60, less $5,826.23, or 
$4,467.37; and that plaintiff Maxwell was entitled to $4,371.13, 
less $381.00, or $3,990.13. The court also found that 
plaintiff Cannon was entitled to $8,566.95, and plaintiff 
Van Luyk to $12,591.11. It did not make any deductions for 
Cannon's deficit balance of $4,674.41 or Van Luyk's deficit 
balance of $3,069.07, on the theory that under the contract 
between Stevens and the Robinsons, those deficit balances 
had been paid by the Robinsons, and it would be "wrong" to 
deduct them again (R. 765). 
It was the conclusion of the court that the plaintiffs 
had a "vested right" in their contracts with the defendant, 
and that there was no accord and satisfaction because "the 
plaintiffs who executed those checks were not aware of their 
rights or were unaware that their claims were in dispute or 
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that the schools were being sold and in this regard this 
court refers the parties to the case of Bennett v. Robinson 
Medical Mart" (R. 766) . Judgment was entered for the bal-
ances found to be due (R. 768) . 
ARGUMENT 
' • • •
 I 
THE COURT ERRED IN CONSTRUING THE CONTRACTS AS ENTITLING 
PLAINTIFFS TO COMMISSIONS AFTER DEFENDANT HAD CEASED TO OPERATE 
THE TWO COLLEGES. 
Although the contracts in this case contained a provision 
for the payment of commissions after the termination of employ-
ment , there was nothing in the contract expressly governing 
the rights of the parties in event the Stevens terminated 
operation of the colleges. The employment agreement provides 
as follows: 
In the event this agreement is term-
inated by either party and there exists a 
deficit balance in your commission accountf 
the commissions earned from the day of term-
ination forward will be applied toward the 
deficit balance until that balance has been 
satisfied. Credit balances on this commission 
account after termination can be drawn quarterly, 
the draw to be made during the last month of each 
quarter, permitting the college to complete the 
accounting statements and reports for that quarter. 
This provision must be read with Paragraph VII of the 
contract, which provides for commissions only on "tuitions 
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received by the college from all approved enrollments" 
(Exhibit 1-P) . 
The evidence is uncontroverted that after December 31, 
1973, Stevens Schools of Business, Inc., did not receive any 
tuitions. Thus the court is requiring Stevens to pay com-
missions on monies never received by it, something that is 
completely outside of the scope of the contractual agreement. 
A number of cases have considered the right of agents 
to renewal commissions in those instances in which a principal 
has either become insolvent or has ceased to do business. 
Most of the cases deal with insurance agents, but they are 
analogous to the present one, and establish principles which 
prevent recovery by the plaintiffs in this proceeding. 
People of the State of Illinois v. Peoria Life Insurance 
Co. (Harwick v. OyHern), 376 111. 517, 34 N.E. 2d 829, 136 
ALR 151 (1941), was an action by a group of life insurance 
agents against a receiver to recover commissions on renewal 
premiums paid to the receiver of their former employer, 
Peoria Life Insurance Co. Under the agreements between 
Peoria and the agents, the agents were to solicit life 
insurance business, and the commissions they were to receive 
were to be paid on renewal premiums for various periods of 
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years specified in each individual contract. Many of the 
agreements as to commissions on renewal premiums extended 
far beyond the date of dissolution of the Peoria company* 
All of the renewal commissions had been paid to the claimants 
in accordance with the terms of their contracts up to the 
date of appointment of the receiver, but shortly after his 
appointment the court ordered the receiver to hold all 
premium payments received. 
In holding that the agents were not entitled to any 
commissions on premiums paid after the insolvency of Peoria 
and appointment of a receiver for its assets, the Illinois 
Supreme Court said: 
In contracts which require the continued 
existence of the particular person or thing, 
the destruction or death of that person or 
thing will terminate the agreement. [Citations 
omitted.] The agency contracts here in question 
were necessarily and as a matter of law dependent 
for their continued existence upon a lawfully 
continued existence of the Peoria company and the 
parties are conclusively presumed to have entered 
into those contracts in contemplation of the 
possibility of the insurance company's insolvency 
and its liquidation under the Insurance Liquida-
tion Act above cited. 
Layton v. Illinois Life Insurance Co. (Bachman v. Davis), 
81 F.2d 600 (7 Cir. 1936), was an action by an insurance 
agent to recover commissions on renewal premiums under a 
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written agreement, the insurance company having gone into 
receivership and ceased to do business. 
Section 21 of the contract provided for commissions "upon 
the second and subsequent years' premiums, which shall, during 
his continuance as said agent of said first party, be obtained, 
collected, paid to and received by the said first party, in 
cash, on policies of insurance effected with said first party 
by or through said second party." Section 28 of the contract 
provided that if the agent were "duly terminated" without 
the agent having violated any of the terms of the contract, 
the agent "shall continue to receive the renewal commissions 
* * * for as many full years as he may already been paid 
renewal commissions hereunder." 
The agent contended that the provision of Section 28 
for a post-agency commission was not terminable at the will 
of the principal, and had been breached by the appointment of a 
receiver and the consequent inability of the company to per-
form. The court held that there was no breach by the insur-
ance company and that the agent was not entitled to commissions 
on renewal premiums. The court said: 
The very nature of the agency contract 
impels the conclusion that it must have been 
within the contemplation of the contracting 
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parties that the company might some day be-
come incapacitated from continuing in the 
insurance business. When the district court 
assumed jurisdiction over the affairs of the 
company and appointed a receiver, we think 
this amounted to a termination of the contract 
by operation of law reasonably within the con-
templation of the parties and not an actionable 
breach on the part of the company. 
* * * 
We think it cannot be said that the 
company engaged itself unconditionally to 
remain in business for any given period and 
thus be in a position to receive the renewal 
premiums. The continued solvency of the com-
pany and its continued ability to collect and 
receive future premiums from.those insured 
was one of the contingencies to be accepted 
alike by the agent and the company and, there-
fore, within the reasonable contemplation of 
the parties. The success or failure of the 
company was of like importance to the agent 
and the company. 
If it, therefore, be assumed (which we 
do only for illustration) that the termina-
tion of the contract by the receivership pro-
ceeding is the "due termination" provided for 
in Section 28, still appellant has the un-
surmountable barrier of Section 21—the 
actual collection and receipt of the prem-
iums. 
We think a fair construction of the con-
tract as a whole indicates clearly that the 
right to renewal commissions is conditioned 
on the continued existence of the company and 
the continued collection of premiums. 
In Moore v. Security Trust & Life Ins. Co., 168 Fed. 496 
(8 Cir. 19 09), the insurance company had turned over all its 
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business and assets to a rival company and incapacitated it-
self to continue the insurance business. In addressing the 
issue of breach, the court asked: 
Does a contract by a life insurance company 
whereby, at or after the lawful conclusion of the 
term of the agency, it turns over to a rival com-
pany all of its business and assets and disables 
itself from collecting future renewal premiums 
upon its policies, constitute an anticipatory 
breach of an agreement with its agents that after 
the termination of their agency commissions 
will be paid on such future premiums as 
collected by the company, which will sustain 
an action for the present worth of the future 
commissions before the renewal premiums have 
become due or been collected? 
The answer was "No." The court pointed out that the 
agreement required the agents to "devote their time and best 
energies to the service of said company," and "pay all the 
expenses of conducting the business transacted under the 
terms of the contract/1 and noted that there was no pro-
vision that they should continue to do so during the term of 
their natural lives or during any other specified time. The 
court thought that a like interpretation should be given to 
the commitment of the insurance company. With respect to 
that, the court said: 
The implication invoked that the contract 
was not terminable at will, because it contained 
clauses, unnecessary if it was so terminable, 
specifying causes for its termination, is too 
feeble to withstand the compelling force of the 
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presumption that the plaintiffs could not have 
intended to surrender control of their own 
business and services for life, and the defen-
dant could not have intended to surrender its 
right to limit the exercise of its right to 
manage, control, continue, or terminate its 
business of insurance at will. The existence 
of this right in the defendant and its free 
and continuous exercise were implied in this 
contract of agency, and the plaintiffs took 
the chances of its exercise when they signed 
the agreement and entered upon their service 
under it. 
Also holding that there is no implied agreement that a 
principal will not cease doing business is Pellett v. 
Manufacturers1 & Merchants' Ins. Co. of Pittsburg, Pa., 104 
Fed. 502 (7 Cir. 1900); and see Wallman v. United Casualty 
Co., 147 F.2d 636 (3 Cir. 1944); O'Hern v. DeLong, 298 111. 
App. 375, 19 NE 214 (1939); Annotation, "Insurance agent's 
right to commissions on renewal premiums," 36 ALR 3rd 958, 
1018-1023; 3 Am.Jur. 2d, Agency, §57. 
In the instant case, the continued existence of the 
colleges as colleges was a fact, within the contemplation of 
the parties, that was essential to the performance of the 
agreement with respect to renewal commissions. If the college 
ceased to operate, the right to renewal commissions necessarily 
ended; and Stevens had no duty to continue the schools in 
existence. As in Moore, supra, it is not to be assumed that 
the defendant meant to give up all control of the operation 
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of its business, to continue the business even if unprofit-
able, and forego its right to make the necessary business 
judgments necessitated by the unprofitability of the colleges. 
The fact that Stevens received some money in settlement 
of an anti-trust claim from L.D.S. Business College, and 
from sale of the Ogden school, has no bearing upon the 
rights of the plaintiffs in this case. The defendant had a 
right to sell the colleges, or close them, or change admis-
sion standards, or expel students, or do any number of 
things that might have reduced or eliminated commissions 
payable to the plaintiffs. Nothing in the contract, express 
or implied, prohibits the defendant from exercising its 
business judgment with respect to the operation of its 
business. 
The plaintiffs1 contracts with Stevens gave them rights 
to commissions "on tuitions received by the college." Inas-
much as there were no tuitions received by the college after 
December 31, 1973, there is no entitlement to commissions 
under the express terms of the employment agreements. 
The cases also- hold that where no definite term is fixed 
in an agency contract, it is terminable at will. In Moore 
v. Security Trust & Life Ins. Co., 168 Fed. 496, (8 Cir. 1909), 
supra, the court distinguished cases in which there was a 
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fixed term, saying (at page 503) : 
* * * an implication that the company 
will continue its business for the agreed 
term of the agency may inhere in such a 
time contract, while it does not in a con-
tract of agency at will * * *. 
Accord: Hollweg v. Schaefer Brokerage Co., 197 Fed. 689 (6 
Cir. 1912); Wheeler v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 227 Fed. 369, 
373 (8 Cir. 1915); Forbis v. Educators Automobile Ins. Co., 
289 F.Supp. 667, 669 (D.C.W.D. Okl. 1965); 2 Restatement of 
Agency 2d §450, comment a. 
In this case there was no agreement to continue the 
agency for a definite term. Article IX of the Employment 
Agreement (Exhibit 1-P) provides that "this agreement will 
remain in force so long as it is mutually agreeable to both 
parties." This created an agency at will, and no liability 
resulted when it was terminated by defendant's cessation of 
business. 
II . '.\ 
THE COURT'S FINDING WITH RESPECT TO AN ACCORD AND 
SATISFACTION IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE. 
The court's Finding of Fact No. 11 (R. 765) reads as 
follows: 
So far as the defendant's claim of accord 
and satisfaction or release in full, whatever 
terminology one desires to use, the court is 
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of the opinion that there was no accord and sat-
isfaction, release or settlement in full by the 
endorsement of the checks in question upon the 
grounds and for the reasons that the plaintiffs 
who executed those checks were not aware of their 
rights or were unaware that their claims were in 
dispute or that the schools were being sold and 
in this regard the court refers the parties to the 
case of Bennett v. Robinson Medical Mart. 
This finding is relative to the defendant's claim that 
plaintiffs Davis, Teeples and Maxwell, were bound by the 
endorsement agreement on checks sent to them by Stevens, 
which agreement read as follows: 
Endorsement of this check constitutes ack-
nowledgement of the termination effective 
12-31-73, of my Employment Agreement with 
Stevens Henager College dated [date], and 
constitutes final and full payment by Stevens 
Henager College to me in settlement of any and 
all obligations due me from Stevens Henager 
College. 
The three plaintiffs testified about what they knew and 
did not know at the time they received the checks. 
Plaintiff Van Luyk testified that the endorsement was 
on the check when it was received and that he signed it. He 
also testified that at the time he cashed the check he added 
the words "endorser in no way agrees that" at the top of the 
endorsement; that he had asked an attorney about the added 
language; that the attorney "didn't think it would make any 
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difference but it would be all right to put it on there"; 
that the check was received on or about February 1, 1974; 
and that at the time he received the check he was aware that 
he had claims against Stevens (Tr. 131, 132). 
Plaintiff Teeples testified that the check had been 
submitted to him; that an endorsement had been placed upon 
the check; that the endorsement was an attempt on the part 
of Stevens to wipe out the sums of future commissions; that 
he was shocked and "cashed the check anywayf" though he did 
not agree that future commissions were wiped out (Tr. 189) . 
Prior to the sending of the check, near the end of 1973, he 
had a discussion with Wells Stevens in which Mr. Stevens 
said that they were willing to waive the deficit balance in 
return for Mr. Teeples waiving his claims (Tr. 199). Before 
cashing the check Mr. Teeples did not inform defendant of any 
objection to it. 
Plaintiff Maxwell testified that he received the check 
and instructed his secretary to add the words "endorser 
doesn't agree" at the top of the check, but she mistakenly 
typed "endorsee" instead of "endorser." Mr. Maxwell did not 
contact anyone representing the Schools before adding the 
words "endorsee in no way agrees that" at the top of the 
endorsement. The check was received sometime during the 
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first part of February, at which time Mr. Maxwell believed 
that he had additonal claims for commissions against the 
defendant (Tr. 229). 
Notwithstanding the testimony that the checks were re-
ceived in February, more than a month after Stevens had sold 
the Ogden college, Finding No. 11 was that the plaintiffs who 
executed those checks were not aware that the schools were 
being sold. But Mr. Van Luyk had been working at the Ogden 
college and went to work for the Robinsons when the sale was 
consummated. Mr. Teeples went to work for Mr. Robinson on 
January 2, 1974, a month before the check was presented to 
him (Tr. 60). It would have made no difference whether plain-
tiff Maxwell knew that the Ogden college was being sold. He 
had nothing to do with it (Tr. 223). 
And in the face of the testimony of the plaintiffs that 
they were aware that they had claims against the defendant, 
the court found they "were not aware of their rights or were 
unaware that their claims were in dispute." There is no 
evidence in the record to suggest that they were not aware 
of their rights; and it makes no difference whether they were 
aware that the claims were in dispute. They knew what was 
offered and what they claimed. 
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Ill 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD THAT THE CLAIMS OF PLAINTIFFS 
VAN LUYK, TEEPLES, AND MAXWELL HAD BEEN DISCHARGED BY ACCORD 
AND SATISFACTION. 
When there is a dispute or uncertainty as to how much is 
owed on a debt, the parties may agree that the creditor will 
accept less than his total claim as a compromise in satisfac-
tion of the debt. The agreement becomes a new contract. Tates, 
Inc., v. Little America Refining Company, 535 P.2d 1228, 1229-
30, (Utah 1975). For a payment to constitute an accord and 
satisfaction (1) the amount owed must be in dispute or un-
certain, and (2) there must be an agreement that the payment 
shall constitute full satisfaction of the debt. 
In this case the amounts due to plaintiffs were uncertain; 
in fact, it was and is uncertain whether they have any valid 
claims at all. Sums were owed to Stevens for advances, and 
the claims for future commissions were in doubt. The only re-
maining question is whether there was the necessary agreement. 
In cases in which this court has failed to find an accord 
and satisfaction, it has stressed the fact that there was no 
express, unambiguous agreement that the payment was to con-
stitute full satisfaction. 
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In Tates, supra, the debtor tried to prove an agree-
ment by a conversation and a letter, followed by the cashing 
of the payment check. The court found the circumstances 
ambiguous, not clearly showing that the creditor understood 
or agreed to a settlement. The court believed it significant 
that the check did not bear "payment in full" or words of 
similar import. (535 P.2d at 1231). 
This court again stressed the importance of an express 
agreement in Hintze v. Seaich, 20 Utah 2d 275, 437 P.2d 202 
(1968), where the debtor tried to prove an accord and satis-
faction through acceptance and cashing of the check by the 
creditor. The court refused to imply an agreement, citing 
1 Am.Jur. 2d, Accord and Satisfaction §15 for the proposition 
that before a check can operate as a full discharge there must 
be an express agreement to that effect. 
In two other cases this court required that the agree-
ment be unambiguous. In Bennett v. Robinsons Medical Mart, 
18 Utah 2d 186, 417 P.2d 761 (1966) and Oilman-v. Matthew 
Ferguson, Inc., 13 Utah 2d 142, 369 P.2d 269 (1962), the state-
ments "Payment in full of the account stated below—Endorse-
ment of check by payee is sufficient receipt11 and "the amount 
due in full to complete recent buy-backs" on the checks were 
held to be too unclear to be satisfaction of all accounts and 
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all claims. In Dilman the court cites 1 Am.Jur. 2d, Accord 
and Satisfaction §31, which states: 
In some instances the words "in full pay-
ment" or those of similar tenor, do not neces-
sarily import or prove an accord, for it may 
be that there is more than one account pending 
between the parties. 
In the present case, the statement is unambiguous as to 
what accounts or claims the checks shall satisfy: all and 
any claims. This being so, an accord and satisfaction was 
reached when each check was cashed, and it cannot be defeated 
by unilateral alterations or uncommunicated intent. 
It is generally held that the cashing of a check 
tendered in full satisfaction of an obligation constitutes 
an acceptance of the offer by the creditor, even though he 
may object to it. The rule as stated in 2 Restatement of 
Contracts §420, is as follows: 
Acceptance by a creditor of any performance 
tendered by the debtor as satisfaction of a pre-
existing contractual duty, or of a duty to make 
compensation, is not prevented from operating as 
satisfaction by the creditor's manifested refusal 
so to regard it. 
A fortiori, it is not prevented from operating as 
satisfaction by a creditor's unmanifested refusal so to 
regard it. 
Where a creditor receives a check from his 
debtor containing the worlds "payment in full," 
"final settlement," or other words of similar 
import, it is his duty to repudiate the offer 
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and return the check or money remitted within a 
reasonable time after it is received if he does 
not care to receive it in full discharge of the 
indebtedness. (1 Am.Jur. 2d, Accord and Satis-
faction §23.) 
It is also well recognized by the courts that the credi-
itor cannot prevent the cashing of the check from operating 
as a satisfaction by obliterating the endorsement or changing 
its wording. 
In Hutchinson v. Culbertson, 161 Pa. Sup. 519, 55 
A.2d 567 (1947) the debtor had sent a check marked on the 
face and back "payment in full," but the creditor had struck 
out the words "payment in full" on the back of the check and 
deposited it. Thereafter the creditor brought an action for 
the balance of what he claimed to be due. In affirming a judg-
ment for the defendant-debtor the court said: 
It has been established that if a check 
bearing a notation indicating that it is of-
fered in full settlement is delivered to the 
creditor, the retention and use of the check 
by the creditor constitutes an accord and sat-
isfaction. [Citations omitted.] He cannot 
avoid the dilemma of returning the check or 
keeping it in full satisfaction by erasing or 
obliterating the words which import complete 
satisfaction. 
A similar obliteration was involved in Deuches v. Grand 
Rapids Brass Co., 240 Mich. 266, 215 NW 392 (1927), in 
which the court said: 
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Nor does it avail plaintiff that, after accept-
ing and before cashing the check, he, without 
the knowledge or consent of defendant, obliter-
ated from it the statement of the conditions 
upon which it was given. In the case of In 
re Estate of Cunningham, 311 111. 311, 142 
NW 740, it was said: 
"The fact that the words 'in full1 are 
erased from the check or receipt by the creditor 
does not affect the question whether the proffer 
and acceptance of the check constitute an accord 
and satisfaction, where the erasure is without 
the knowledge or authority of the debtor." 
This is the general rule. See Riser v. Wilberforce University, 
33 Ohio L. Abs. 438, 35 NE 2d 771 (1927); Wilmeth v. Lee, 
316 P.2d 614 (Okl. 1957); and 1 Am.Jur. 2d, Accord and Satis-
faction §22. 
Stevens made a clear and unequivocal offer to each of 
the three plaintiffs, Van Luyk, Teeples, and Maxwell; the 
offers were accepted; and accord and satisfaction resulted• 
*
v 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SET OFF AGAINST THE 
CLAIMS OF PLAINTIFFS VAN LUYK AND CANNON THE .AMOUNTS DUE 
TO DEFENDANT BECAUSE OF ADVANCES MADE TO THOSE PLAINTIFFS. 
Under its agreement with the plaintiffs, as modified by 
a letter, Stevens made monthly advances to the plaintiffs in 
the amount of approximately $1,000. The amounts were carried 
on the books of the defendant company as debts, and were 
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treated as debts by the parties and by the court. The debit 
balances of plaintiffs Davis, Teeples, and Maxwell were set 
off by the trial court against the amounts claimed to be due 
as earnings, but the court did not allow any set off against 
the claims of plaintiffs Cannon and Van Luyk. In its Finding 
No. 9 the court said: 
It will be noted in determining the amounts 
due Cannon and Van Luyk that the draws for which 
the defendant was counterclaiming are not deducted 
from the total amount the court finds are due Cannon 
and Van Luyk. The defendant was very careful in its 
preparation of the agreement between itself and Mr. 
Robinson in the sale of the Ogden school to make sure 
that the Ogden school paid the draws of these plain-
tiffs in connection with the purchase price. The 
same having been paid it would be wrong to again 
deduct them. 
Why "wrong"? Neither of the plaintiffs had anything to 
do with the contract between Stevens and the Robinsons. The 
purchase price was established in a number of ways. 
The basic purchase price was $267,000 payable in install-
ments, and the Robinsons also agreed to pay receivables due 
to Stevens from Cannon and Van Luyk in the amount of $8,613.13, 
a bookstore inventory in the amount of $5,119.63, and pre-
payments on insurance, maintenance, postage, etc., in the 
amount of $3,182.19. They also agreed to pay certain accounts 
payable which were related to the 1974 operations, in the 
amount of $3,558.77 (Exhibit 6-P). 
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It is difficult to conceive how plaintiffs Cannon and 
Van Luyk acquired any rights by virtue of the contract between 
Stevens and the Robinsons, to which they were total strangers. 
The Ogden college was valued at $350,000 and was sold to 
the Robinsons for a total purchase price of approximately 
$287,500. The manner in which the purchase price is computed 
has no bearing upon the liabilities of the parties in this 
case, and neither court nor counsel has advanced any theory 
to support failure to allow the set off other than that to 
charge the debit balances would be "wrong." 
Defendant Stevens Schools of Business had no contract 
with Mr. Cannon or Mr. Van Luyk under which the debit bal-
ances would be forgiven. Plaintiffs had no contract with 
the Robinsons under which the sums would be forgiven. There 
is no evidence tending to show that plaintiffs Cannon and 
Van Luyk were either creditor beneficiaries or donee bene-
ficiaries under the contract between defendant and the 
Robinsons. 
Under the provisions of 1 Restatement of Contracts 
§133, a donee beneficiary is created if it appears that the 
purpose of the promise was to make a gift to the beneficiary, 
and a creditor beneficiary is found if the purpose of the 
promise "will satisfy an actual or supposed or asserted duty 
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of the promisee to the beneficiary." An incidental beneficiary 
is one who is neither a donee beneficiary or a creditor 
beneficiary, and as stated in 1 Restatement of Contracts §147: 
An incidental beneficiary acquires by 
virtue of the promise no right against the 
promisor or the promisee. 
It would thus appear that no rights are created in either 
Mr. Cannon or Mr. Van Luyk by virtue of the contract between 
the Robinsons and Stevens. 
It may be that the court believed that the obligations 
of the two plaintiffs had been either (1) discharged by the 
Robinsons1 payment, or (2) purchased by the Robinsons under 
the agreement (Exhibit 6-P). In either case, however, de-
fendant should have credit for the payments because they were 
made from commissions that would have been due to the two 
plaintiffs. 
Exhibits 14-P and 15-P are checks and invoices used by 
the Robinsons in making payments to the schools. They show 
funds as having been paid from Cannonfs and Van Luyk's "com-
missions wtr. qtr." and "prepaid commissions." And Mr. 
Robinson testified that the debit balances were paid from 
commissions payable to Van Luyk and Cannon, from the tuitions 
as they came in (Tr. 38-39). 
Thus even if the debit balances of Cannon and Van Luyk 
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were discharged or purchased by the Robinsons, they were 
discharged or purchased with the commissions claimed in 
this action, and the commissions should be reduced by the 
amounts paid, $5,544.06 for Cannon, and $3,069.07 for Van 
Luyk. There is nothing "wrong" in that* 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiffs were entitled to recover only if (1) 
amounts were due under the contract with Stevens, or (2) 
plaintiffs suffered damages because of a breach of the con-
tract by Stevens. 
No amounts were payable under the terms of the contract, 
because tuitions had not been received by Stevens. 
There was no breach of the contract because it was 
implicit in the dealings of the parties that a condition of 
the continued payment of renewal commissions to plaintiffs 
was that the defendant continue to operate the colleges. The 
fact that Stevens ceased to operate the colleges was not a 
breach of contract with any of the plaintiffs because the 
fact that Stevens might someday cease operating the colleges 
was within the reasonable contemplation of the parties when 
the contract was made. 
But even if it were not, the contracts were terminable 
at will according to their terms, and no breach occurred 
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when the contract was terminated by defendants cessation of 
business. 
Should the court determine that there was in fact a 
breach of contract by Stevens, the disputes with plaintiffs 
Van Luyk, Teeples, and Maxwell were settled by an accord and 
satisfaction, and Stevens is entitled to an offset against 
Cannon and Van Luyk of the amounts of their debit balances. 
The judgment of the District Court of Salt Lake County 
should be reversed and the cause remanded to that court for 
entry of judgment in favor of defendant and against the plain-
tiff s, no cause of action, unless the court determines that 
there was no breach of contract and no accord and satisfaction, 
in which event Stevens should have judgment against the plain-
tiffs for the advances made during continuance of the agency 
relationship. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Bryce E. Roe 
ROE AND FOWLER 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
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